Rethinking global justice in non-ideal conditions

In this dissertation, I argue that the two theories that currently dominate philosophical discussions of global justice---nationalism and cosmopolitanism---are inadequate for capturing those global justice claims that arise from the most disadvantaged people in non-ideal conditions caused by globalization. To address these inadequacies, I offer an alternative way of thinking philosophically about global justice.;My project consists of two parts. In the first part (Chapters Two and Three), I argue that the inadequacies of existing philosophical models can be traced to the fundamental methodological presuppositions on which such models are based. In Chapter Two, I offer a comparative analysis between a universalist and a contextualist approach to theorizing about issues of justice. Ultimately, I defend one version of the contextualist approach---a structural contextualism. This approach is grounded in three related claims: (1) The applicability of justice principles has limited scopes; (2) The justice principles are sensitive to the structural context; and finally (3) justification is contextualized. In Chapter Three, I offer a comparative analysis of an idealized contextual approach and a non-idealized contextual approach. I criticize the idealized approach for its inapplicability to actual cases and its exclusion of systematic actual injustice and defend a non-idealized and contextualist approach to justice. The latter approach requires that we begin thinking about justice from examining justice claims and existing condition in the non-ideal world.;In the second part of the dissertation (Chapters Four and Five), I use this non-idealized contextualist approach to analyze issues of justice that arise in the context of globalization. Given my non-idealized contextualist approach, the chapter four focuses on whether and what type of circumstances of justice obtains in the current non-ideal conditions of globalization. Nationalists claim that circumstances of justice do not obtain in the global context, and therefore there are no occasions for justice across borders. Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, contend that the Rawlsian concept of the circumstances of justice obtains across borders, and therefore argue that "cosmopolitan principles" or "the resource distribution principle" are the best remedy in such circumstances of justice. I argue against nationalism by suggesting that circumstances of global justice obtain in the global context and against cosmopolitanism by suggesting that both Humean and Rawlsian conceptions of the circumstances of justice fail to reflect the current circumstances of justice in non-ideal conditions in which the questions of justice arise. After examining the two views in more depth, I shall offer an alternative, more empirically adequate account of the circumstances of global justice, which highlights current women's global justice issues. Finally, I argue that given this account of the actual circumstances of justice, what is required is a transnational perspective on justice, which involves transformative remedies.;In Chapter Five, I focus on the ontological assumptions guiding the nationalist and cosmopolitan models. Within the social ontology of the nationalist model, the main agents of global justice claims are viewed as national collectivities or nation states. By contrast, on the social ontology of the cosmopolitan model, it is individuals, as citizens of the cosmopolitan world, who are viewed as agents of global justice claims or the ultimate unit of justice concern. Given this, I contend that neither nationalism nor cosmopolitanism effectively captures the justice claims of women who suffer as a result of the global economy. Instead, as an alternative to existing models, I propose a transnational feminist model which recognizes transnationalized socio-economic units as ontological conditions of justice that have emerged from current processes of globalization. Furthermore, on this model, transnational women's collectivities---collectivities of individuals who are collectively situated in such trasnationalized circumstances of justice---are viewed as agents of global justice and, thus, claimants of global distributive justice. Although the individual members of such collectivities are differently situated---geographically, nationally, linguistically, culturally, etc---their similar locations in the process of globalization provide a basis for overlapping consensus on global justice claims.