The liberal ideal of political obligations: The Lockean voluntarist vs. Kant's non-voluntarist ideal of political obligations

Which ideal of political obligations is best suited for a liberal theory of justice? Liberal thinkers traditionally follow Locke, arguing that voluntarism is the ideal. In part the thought is that the only alternative to voluntarism, typically attributed to Hobbes and Kant, is absolutism, which has the illiberal conclusion that 'might becomes right'. Contrary to the received view, I argue that Kant offers a liberal ideal of political obligations that is non-consensual, yet nonabsolutist. Additionally, by means of an investigation of Lockean theories of justice, I argue that we have good reason to think that the liberal ideal cannot be voluntarist in nature.; Lockean voluntarism considers the state a mere remedy to the inconveniences of the state of nature. The state of nature is not necessarily a state of wrongdoing, since individuals acting within their natural rights can realise justice. The state's right to exercise individuals' natural rights on their behalf must therefore be explained through individuals' consent to its authority. In this way, individuals' rights set the rightful limits on state coercion. I challenge Lockean voluntarism by investigating the theories of John Locke, Robert Nozick and A. John Simmons. I argue that individuals enforcing their suggested principles of property necessarily wrong each other according to Lockean principles of justice. I conclude that unless the problems identified can be solved, rightful interaction seems in principle impossible in the state of nature and voluntarism cannot be the liberal ideal of political obligations.; Justifying Kant's account involves showing both that individual freedom requires a legal framework and that the non-consensual conception of political obligations does not amount to an absolutist conception of political legitimacy. To the first end, I argue that the rightfulness of assurance and acquisition of property depends on the existence of a public authority. To the second end, I argue that Kant's non-voluntarist position is not absolutist because political obligations depend on the nature of the obligating institutions. Moreover, we see that contrary to the predominant view, Kant's non-consensual and yet non-absolutist position identifies issues of economic justice as lying at the heart of the issue of political obligations.