Essays on economic development, property rights, and natural resource governance

The relationship between property rights, natural resource governance, and economic development has long been a primary subject of inquiry for political economists. Yet much uncertainty remains regarding the association between economic development and insecure property rights; the functioning and impact of collective ownership institutions; and the interaction between formal laws and informal social norms in generating de facto institutional environments. I tackle these interdependent issues in three ways, moving from the macro to the micro. Chapter I re-examines the cross-country research on property rights and economic development, revealing heterogeneity in the level of property rights security enjoyed by groups within countries, and showing that whose property rights are secure and insecure matters fundamentally for the political and economic implications of expropriation risk. Chapter II investigates the interaction between formal laws and informal social norms in generating de facto institutions for natural resource governance, illustrating how informal rules can inadvertently allow groups to overcome potential collective action failures and facilitate environmental conservation. Chapter III addresses the structure and functioning of collective fisheries ownership in Fiji; the dialogic relationship between formal state laws and informal social norms in that context; and the impact of stronger collective ownership rights on household income and food consumption. This research contributes critical insights that have often been obscured by the uni-dimensional conception of property rights pervasive in the economics research literature.