Gazprom and Russia: The economic rationality of Russian foreign energy policy

Charges of imperialism underpinned by coercive economic tactics are some of the accusations leveled against Vladimir Putin's foreign energy policy during his presidential tenure. However, after the traditional policies of coercion failed to secure Russian interests in Europe during the 1990's, this dissertation argues Putin adopted a radically different approach upon his rise to the Presidency. Driven by public demand to continue the domestic subsidization of natural gas and realizing that the chief avenue for securing revenue was in gas sales to Europe, this project suggests that Putin developed a new foreign energy policy approach meant to secure Russian interests. This transformation was accomplished by the Presidential Administration's efforts during Putin's tenure to bring the Russian natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, under its control. Dubbed Persuasive Politics, this paradigm suggests that the foreign energy policies of the Presidential Administration and Gazprom during Putin's tenure were underpinned by the rational economic argument that the only route to Russian resurgence in the medium term was through profitable economic relations with the European states. To test this theoretical approach the author employs a case study analysis of Russian relations with the European Union member state Greece as well as the non-EU state of Ukraine. The intent is to identify how a mutually beneficial relationship was constructed to persuade both governments through the utilization of economic inducements that cooperation with Russia in the natural gas sphere was in their own best interest.