Tanks have left, Gazprom is back: Russian energy companies' expansion towards Poland, Slovakia and Hungary between 1991 and 2004

A casual observant of post-Soviet Russian corporate activity in Central Europe finds a hectic behavior of Russian companies in the Polish, Hungarian and Slovakian economies. There were times when these companies showed great interest toward the region, followed by periods of non-activity. To solve the puzzle, the study tests neoclassical realist theory in explaining Russian corporate propensity to expand into Central Europe. Neoclassical realist theory argues that the relative distribution of power in the international system (independent variable) through the perception of state leaders (intervening variable) together with state power, to be defined as power to mobilize the necessary resources (intervening variable), explain foreign political outcomes (dependent variable). The dissertation draws the following hypothesis from neorealist theory: When the Russian leadership perceives that Russia's relative influence vis-a-vis the West is low and Russia possesses enough state power to mobilize the necessary resources, Russian energy companies will manifest expansionary moves into Central Europe. When Russia does not perceive its influence low and/or does not possess enough state power, Russian companies will not manifest any expansionary moves into Central Europe.; To test the hypotheses the study uses the case study methodology. There is one case examined: Russian energy companies' activity in Central Europe between 1991 and 2004. The study splits this period into five sub-periods which correspond with the widely accepted milestones of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy: 1991-1993 Early Atlanticism, 1994-1996 Facing Nato Enlargement, 1996-1998 Against a Unipolar World, 1998-2000 Instability and Uncertainty, and 2000-2004 The First Putin Presidency. Russian energy companies were very active in two sub-periods: between 1994 and 1996, and between 2000 and 2004. However, they showed little to no interest for expansion in the other three sub-periods: 1991-1993, 1996-1998 and 1998-2000. In Chapters Four and Five the study examines in detail Russian perceptions about Russia's place in the world, changes in its state power and the Russian energy companies' activity in Central Europe where it is applicable. It finds that in the "active periods" (between 1994 and 1996 as well as between 2000 and 2004) Russian leadership assessed the relative power distribution in the international system to be disadvantageous for Russia and at the same time had considerable state power to mobilize. These two variables were not present together in the three "inactive periods". That is to say, the energy companies' Central European activities were consistent with what the hypothesis drawn from neoclassical realist theory would predict.; The study proves the validity of neoclassical realist theory in explaining post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. Additionally, in the Russian studies today it is conventional wisdom that Vladimir Putin turned Russian energy companies into tools of his country's foreign policy vis-a-vis its neighbors. However, this study shows that the phenomenon is neither new, nor dependent on the current Russian president; moreover, it has never been limited to the countries of the former Soviet Union. In fact, ever since 1991, Russian corporate expansion in Central Europe has been driven by the highs and lows of Russian state power and its key decision makers' perceptions about their country's relative power vis-a-vis the West.