| Why do some states' policies converge over time and not others? Why have some counter-terrorism policies in some states converged in the post-9/11 period and not others? Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001, there has been an aggregate trend towards policy convergence in states' counter-terrorism policies. However, there remains significant variation in convergence at the unit level. Specifically, convergence varies across states, across sectors of counter-terrorism policy, and over time. Existing explanations of policy convergence do not adequately explain this complex pattern of variation. In response, I develop an explanation of policy convergence that is original in two ways. First, I integrate instrumental and ideational variables in specifying the factors that affect policy convergence. I argue that policy convergence is a function of the relative gains calculation facing elites and the normative context in which they make that decision. Second, I introduce an original account of how norms matter, through the concept of "normative affirmation." I contend that decisions about policy convergence require elites to mediate between emerging global norms and prevailing local norms. I assume that, faced with such competing norms, elites behave like "social egoists." That is, they prefer to maintain control over the construction of their own identity and they choose norms that affirm their ability to do so. I test this explanation through qualitative case studies of processes of convergence among three states, across three sectors of counter-terrorism policy since 9/11, using a process-tracing approach. Specifically, I analyze convergence among India, Indonesia and Malaysia in the areas of terrorist financing, ship and port security, and entry controls. I find that regulatory controls---promulgated as part of the "global war on terror"---are more likely to attract convergence where states find local justifications to implement global counter-terrorism standards. |
