The Legitimacy of Elected and Appointed Institutions and their Roles in a Political System

This dissertation presents a study showing that the perceived legitimacy for elected and appointed institutions are two fundamentally different forms of legitimacy. They are derived from different sources and interact with the public in different ways. The legitimacy of appointed institutions is derived from perceptions of a principled decision-making process and the legitimacy of elected institutions is derived from elections. These two forms of legitimacy vary on three different properties. The first property is magnitude: the amount of legitimacy attributed to an institution. The second is effectiveness: the degree to which legitimacy is converted into acceptance of an institution's decision. The third is stability: the degree to which legitimacy resists the negative influence of displeasing decisions. Legitimacy derived from principled decision-making is high on effectiveness and high in stability, but only when the institution is perceived as using a principled decision-making process. Legitimacy derived from elections is low in effectiveness and high in stability, irrespective of decision-making process perceptions. The study uses both experimental and observational methods to take advantage of the wide variation in selection method for state supreme court judges in America. It examines the differences between the magnitude, effectiveness and stability of legitimacy for elected and appointed institutions. It compares the legitimacy of elected and appointed courts to the legitimacy of elected state legislatures. Each form of legitimacy allows its associated institution to fulfill its role in a political system. Elected institutions act as institutions of conflict and representation. Every democratic system requires an institution that represents the viewpoints of the public, but when the public is given the ability to express their voice, political conflict necessarily follows. Legitimacy derived from elections is able to withstand this conflict because of its high stability. The conflict and discord built up by elected institutions must be defused before it overwhelms a political system and threatens the system's stability. The role of appointed institutions of de-politicization is to defuse this political conflict before it can overwhelm the political system. The high effectiveness of legitimacy derived from principled decision-making helps defuse political conflict by inducing the public to accept displeasing decisions.