Politics of Constitution-Building for Reconciliation between Political Enemies: A Political Justification for the Peaceful and Gradual Unification of Korea

This project is a normative undertaking – by reconstructing the constitutional theories of Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt, it proposes the possibility of democratically reconciling by means of constitution-building the relationship between South and North Korea, two historical and structural enemies. Appropriating Schmitt’s conceptualization of the people as “constituent power” and Arendt’s re-conceptualization of revolution as a de-jacobinized “new beginning,” it suggests the possibility of unifying the two Koreas through constitution-building in whose processes the people take an active part. I start with what I call “the Korean Question”: the question of how to deconstruct the enmity that pervades both the history and structure of the two Koreas and uncover the path to establishing a new democratic identity without resorting to violence.;Understanding the act of founding a constitutional democracy as the participatory politics that transforms the rule of man to the rule of law, I make a threefold argument: First, democratic constitution-building based on the people’s participation and deliberation is the most justifiable means of unifying the two Koreas. Second, constitution-building is a reasonable way of creating a new democratic Korean identity. Third, in the Korean context, mutual ‘forgiveness’ of past deeds and the ‘promise’ to faithfully bind themselves to the new constitution will be integral to deconstructing the old enemy relations and constructing a new political identity. More broadly, this dissertation provides an opportunity to rethink how historical and structural political enemies can be reconciled through the collective activity of constitution-building. The Korean case demonstrates the possibility of finding an exit out of a state of emergency to normal democratic politics by way of the extraordinary politics of founding a new regime.