| What role do special interest groups play in governmental decision making? Social scientists have debated the role of special interests in governmental decision making for decades with little consensus. Three main competing theories emerge from these debates: state-centered theory, pluralism, and elite-power theory. In my dissertation, I directly test hypotheses derived from these theories. Using longitudinal data, I statistically analyze the influence of special interest groups on governmental decision making by examining how Political Action Committee (PAC) campaign contributions influence legislators' roll call votes over a twenty-year period in the U.S. House, 1985--2004, controlling for factors considered important in roll call voting. Converting my variables into separate legislator-by-legislator matrixes to account for similarities of legislative behavior, I employ an innovative statistical method (Quadratic Assignment Procedure, or 'QAP,' regression) that has a proven record of eliminating the problems associated with relational data.; My findings show a statistically significant impact of PAC contributions on roll call voting, net of other factors---including party. This significant impact is consistent across all twenty years. Further, the findings show that big business PAC contributions have a significant effect on roll call voting, while labor PAC contributions are less significant, particularly in recent years. These findings support the predictions of elite-power theory but fail to support state-centered and pluralist theories. In addition to contributing to the debates among social scientists over class, power, and the role of special interest groups in governmental decision making, my research has policy-oriented implications. In particular, the findings imply that under our current campaign finance system the voices of the people could be muffled by the calls of special interests, suggesting reform may be needed. |
