The overt /covert war in Angola: A case study of the implementation of the Reagan Doctrine

The mid-1980s rhetoric of anticommunism, support to freedom fighters and the Reagan Doctrine were seen as key drivers for United States policy towards Angola during the Reagan presidency. In fact, U.S. policy towards Angola was remarkably consistent over a longer period of time. Before, during and after the Reagan doctrine was established, the United States remained functionally aligned with the Angolan government even as it publicly embraced the Angolan rebels. This dissertation examines the U.S. policy towards the sparring antagonists in Angola between 1975 and 1992. It explores what really constituted the Reagan Doctrine, examines the doctrine's ideological evolution and purpose, and quantifies exactly how it was, and was not, applied in Angola. A set of ten Angola and related decision cases from this timeframe are tested against a collection of state, sub-state and extra-state level of analysis foreign policy decision-making theories, as well as doctrinal consistency, to determine exactly who and what was driving U.S. policy.;The dissertation suggests that the Reagan Doctrine in Angola was not a new U.S. policy direction, and that there are other policy-related purposes for proclaiming a "doctrine." It also challenges the idea that the Reagan Doctrine was truly Reagan's own, and proposes that it was more accurately a widely resisted doctrine of a faction of more aggressive interventionists within the successive administrations and Congress.