| This thesis examines the role of foreign support to the mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency in Angola both beginning in the 1970's and continuing into the early 1990's. It analyzes state support to both conflicts in terms of safe haven, training, arms, money, advisors, and direct military support. It presents four key findings. First, direct military support, arms, and money tend to increase the capability of insurgents more than training or advisors. Second, only money and arms tend to provide a state sponsor long term influence over insurgent groups. Third, state support to insurgent groups works better when it is only a single component in a broader foreign policy which also utilizes economic, conventional military, and diplomatic power to influence the targeted state. Finally, only a well coordinated policy, which integrates the efforts of different domestic agencies as well as foreign allies, is likely to provide the desired mix of effectiveness, efficiency, and control over the insurgent group. |
