| The present study proposes to explain the nature of Russian civil-military relations in 1999 through the analysis of the causes that, from a Russian point of view, led to the outbreak of the Second Chechen War. To achieve this goal, this work focuses on how the specific causes of the conflict, namely, instability in Chechnya and the Kosovo Crisis, affected the civil-military relationship. The method followed is an inductive one, recording relevant statements and actions of both civilian government officials and high-ranking military officers, together with external events considered to have influenced the relationship. The research information was examined chronologically, since the timing of developing situations, statements and actions was deemed important for the analysis of the collected data. Recurring views from official statements made at different times were included, for their frequency could help reach reasonable assumptions. Sources include relevant press reports, Internet-based news resources such as Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe, memoirs, and the few general academic studies available on post-Soviet Russian civil-military relations. Although this work does not attempt to cover Russian civil-military relations for the entire post-Soviet period, for the months of 1999 prior to the outbreak of the war, it can be concluded that: (1) There was cooperation under consensus in civil-military relations on the decisions taken in March and July to carry out limited military operations against Chechnya, but disagreement and cooperation under conflict with regard to the September decision to invade the whole of the Republic. (2) Neo-Eurasianist thinking influenced large segments of the military. (3) The military was politicized and divided. (4) The intelligence apparatus was a third actor in the relationship as it began to fill Kremlin positions, to reinforce the central power of the state. |
