| This study focuses on a core concern of democratic consolidation, the origins of and conditions for the establishment of horizontal accountability. Using the case of the 1994 Mexican judicial reform, the central argument is that judicial independence can come about well ahead of the establishment of full procedural democracy under less than favorable circumstances. It can emanate from non-democratic actors, occur through non-democratic processes, and emerge even in the absence of external pressure, domestic constituencies, and conflict. The study concludes that Mexican reformer motivations were shaped in part by presidential commitment and reaction to corruption, and in part by broader processes of democratization, particularly concerning elections that included short-term electoral calculations and the need to create a credible arbiter for political disputes.; The research methods used are qualitative. They include a systematic review of academic literature on democratization, institution building, and judicial reforms, as well as official documents and newspaper reports. They also include interviews with key actors and observers to assess the accurateness of five alternative explanations for the reform: (1) long-term electoral calculations, (2) altruistic motives, (3) desire to appoint a loyal court, (4) need for a credible arbiter, and (5) short-term electoral calculations. The degree of judicial independence resulting from the reform is assessed by analyzing structural safeguards on the input side, and degree of actual implementation as well as Supreme Court rulings against the executive in politically significant cases on the output side.; Although the findings apply primarily to the Mexican case, they offer a challenge to conventional wisdom that expects democratic, non-one party governments to engage in institutional redesign. They also demonstrate the inaccuracy of the generally accepted conclusion that reform toward full democratic institutionalization requires support by all significant actors to the rules of democratic procedures. The findings suggest, in addition, that executive commitment and control of the state are more important conditions for success than the development of support constituencies. Finally, they present judicial reform as part of the process of democratization and not only as a factor likely to influence its success. |
