Assessing the effectiveness of leadership decapitation against terrorist organizations

This project answers four questions: (1) Under what conditions does leadership decapitation result in the dissolution of a terrorist organization? (2) Does leadership decapitation increase the likelihood of organizational collapse beyond the baseline rate of collapse for groups over time? (3) In cases where decapitation does not result in group collapse, to what extent does it result in organizational degradation and hinder a group's ability to carry about terrorist attack? And (4) what explains the success and failure of decapitation?;In order to answer these questions, I developed a dataset of 298 incidents of leadership targeting from 1945--2004. First, I identify the conditions under which decapitation has been successful in bringing about organizational decline. The data show that a group's age, size, and type, are critical in identifying when decapitation will cause the cessation of terrorist activity. As an organization grows in size and age, it is much more likely to withstand the removal of its leadership. Organizational type is also significant in understanding the susceptibility of an organization to decapitation. Ideological organizations are most likely to cease activity following the removal of leader, while religious organizations are highly resistant to leadership decapitation. Second, I determine whether decapitation is an effective counterterrorism strategy. The data show that decapitation does not increase the likelihood of organizational collapse beyond a baseline rate of collapse for groups over time. Organizations that have not had their leaders removed are more likely to fall apart than those that have undergone a loss of leadership. The marginal utility of decapitation is negative for many groups, particularly for larger, older, religious, and separatist organizations. Finally, I look at the extent to which decapitation results in organizational degradation by looking at changes in the frequency and lethality of attacks carried out by HAMAS, ETA, and FARC.;In order to explain why certain groups are more susceptible to leadership decapitation, I develop a theory of organizational resilience. Specifically, I develop a theory to explain why small, young, and ideological groups are easier to destabilize than older, larger, and religious groups. I argue that organizational resilience is dependent upon two primary variables: bureaucratization and communal support. First, bureaucratization is an internal mechanism that increases group stability and facilitates a clear succession process. Older and/or larger organizations should have developed bureaucratic features, increasing their stability and ability to withstand attacks on their leadership. Second, communal support plays an important role in providing the resources necessary for a terrorist group to function and survive.;I look at Hamas and Shining Path in order to evaluate whether bureaucratization and communal support can explain why decapitation was unsuccessful against Hamas and successful against Shining Path. Hamas has experienced numerous leadership attacks, which have led neither to its collapse nor its substantial weakening. While the lethality of attacks has declined over time, the number of attacks has increased. In fact, leadership decapitation may actually have adverse consequences. Hamas' resilience can be explained largely by its size, age, and group type. These variables can be explained by Hamas' bureaucratic structure and by the extent of its communal support. First, Hamas is structured as a bureaucratic hierarchy, which is a key factor in Hamas' strength and resilience to Israeli targeting efforts. Second, Hamas has a significant amount of local popular support, providing resources necessary for group survival. Hamas has developed an extensive infrastructure for the provision of social services to local communities. The provision of religious, social, and educational resources is an importance mechanism by which Hamas has developed not only support, but is able to influence the ideological and religious beliefs of the community. In order to evaluate communal support, I look data on Palestinian support for Hamas from 1994--2007. Finally, the case of Hamas shows that leadership decapitation can have adverse consequences. It can motivate retaliatory attacks, fuel Palestinian public support for Hamas, and increase its political legitimacy.;The second case study, on Shining Path, evaluates a successful case of decapitation. At the time of its demise, it was a large and older organization, which runs counter to the statistical findings in chapter two. However, earlier instances of leadership decapitation were not effective against Shining Path, it was not until the arrest of its leader in 1999 that organizational activity significantly declined. As a result, this chapter accounts for variation in the success of decapitation against Shining Path. I argue that its susceptibility to organizational destabilization was due to the lack of support inherent to ideologically driven terrorist organization. Support for the organization changed over time and can thus account for variation in the effectiveness of leadership decapitation against Shining Path. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)...