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Implications of incentive-based conservation programs for governance, gender and collective action in the Uluguru Mountains, Tanzania

Posted on:2012-01-30Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:Michigan State UniversityCandidate:Vardhan, MamtaFull Text:PDF
GTID:1456390008997581Subject:Geography
Abstract/Summary:
Payment for environmental services (PES) is often promoted as a win-win option for conservation and development, but its potential social impacts remain underexplored. PES literature has not focused much attention to the important issues of institutions and governance underlying PES projects, the potential of PES to alter existing rights to resources which may work against marginal groups, and the possible perverse impacts of introducing money on collective action for provision of ecosystem services. This research explores these issues in the context of tree planting programs and forest management arrangements in the Uluguru Mountains in Tanzania. The first essay, "Forest Governance in Participatory Forest Management Regimes in Tanzania: Lessons for REDD," indicates that although participatory forestry programs appear to offer a good institutional base for launching REDD, in practice they are plagued by poor governance, corrupt practices and low accountability. Participatory forestry institutions in Tanzania need to be strengthened in order to ensure effective and equitable implementation of REDD. The second essay, "Payments for Environmental Services and Women's Land Rights in the Uluguru Mountains, Tanzania," presents a case where men in the study villages have used tree planting projects to claim women's lands. The paper cautions that contestations over land may become pronounced if PES projects continue to ignore the social relationships underlying the production of ecosystem services. The third essay, "Pro-Social Behavior and Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the Uluguru Mountains, Tanzania," explores the impact of payments on collective action through village-level field experiments. It shows that participation in communal tasks is high irrespective of the incentive; high payments can increase participation but low payments can reduce participation relative to when no payment is made.
Keywords/Search Tags:Uluguru mountains, Collective action, PES, Tanzania, Governance, Programs, Payments, Services
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