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Governing Together: The Concertacion Administrations in Chile (1990--2009)

Posted on:2012-02-04Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:The University of North Carolina at Chapel HillCandidate:Davila Avendano, MireyaFull Text:PDF
GTID:1456390011954454Subject:Political science
Abstract/Summary:
Achieving stability in government coalitions within presidential systems is not a common political phenomenon. On March 11, 2010, the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD - Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia), a coalition created in Chile to defeat Pinochet, ended twenty years in power. Its continuity is particularly surprising if we consider that this coalition was formed by parties and political leaders who, in the sixties and at the beginning of the seventies, were political enemies. Why was the Concertacion one of the most successful coalitions in Latin American political history? From a political science point of view, the most common explanations provided to understand this phenomenon have mainly been external, focused on institutions and context. We argue that the success of the Concertacion was also due to its ability to sustain coalition governability, in itself understood as the maintaining of coalitions and cabinet stability. We analyze two dependent variables: one at a party level (maintaining coalitions) and the other at an individual level (cabinet stability). We have two sets of explanations or independent variables for coalition and cabinet stability: long-term ones, related to political learning, and short-term contextual ones, related to presidential autonomy (suprapartidismo), the informal rules of power sharing and the political use of technocrats. In developing our argument, we build on hypotheses drawn from the literature on technocrats as well as different findings regarding coalition theory and informal rules. Using descriptive statistics, we analyze all the Concertacion cabinets as a single case study, contrasting it to earlier periods. We also explore variation across the four Concertacion administrations. Our main finding is that, in comparison to pre-1973 democracy, the Concertacion administrations were more stable, with the Aylwin administration the most stable. We also observe that the patterns of power distribution and cabinet administration in the other Concertacion administrations vary in relation to how Presidents administer their autonomy (suprapartidismo), apply informal rules of power sharing and appoint technocrats. Suprapartidismo is the independent variable that most explains change.
Keywords/Search Tags:Concertacion administrations, Informal rules, Political, Coalition, Stability, Power
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