| My dissertation asks why East Asian governments, which maintain substantial discretionary power over trade policy, consider using the WTO dispute settlement system and how their decision-making is affected by structural factors inherent in past government-business relations. I argue that, in order to maintain relevance in the export sector, more and more East Asian states are using WTO dispute settlement in order to reduce export barriers. However, the extent for their success is determined by the structure of the export sector and the degree of government collaboration with exporters. The states that successfully promote their global trade interests through use of WTO dispute settlement are the ones that have sufficient support from and collaboration with their leading exporters. I present a comparative study of Korea and Taiwan's experience in responding to export barriers. Korea represents a case where its leading exporters, namely the rising multinational corporations, are powerful and capable of both organizing industry-wide campaigns and collaborating with the government to contest export restrictions overseas. In contrast, Taiwan represents a case where the leading exporters, small and subcontracting-based corporations, are either incapable of or not interested in launching high-profile contestations over trade disputes because of their export model and their distance from the government. I also make a single case study of China's handling of foreign-imposed export restrictions to discern the role of the state and the pattern of how the structure of the export sector and government-exporter collaboration affects the government's policy towards trade disputes. |
