Domestic institutions and international trade policy

This dissertation focuses on variations in countries' trade-policy responses to international economic pressures. The literature on the subject of trade policy has focused in large part on the impact of the preferences of societal interest groups on policy decisions, and there has been relatively little cross-national work on how domestic political institutions affect such decisions. The dissertation addresses this imbalance by examining how the number of institutional veto points and partisan veto players in countries' political systems affects how they react to changes in growth, unemployment, and trade balances. In brief, my argument is that an increase in the number of veto points or players will reduce the likelihood of major policy changes in response to changing economic conditions. I test this argument using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative side tests for correlation between the number of veto points/players and percent changes in both tariff levels and non-tariff barrier levels in developed countries during the periods 1920--1939 and 1960--1996. The qualitative side compares the policy responses of Imperial Germany and the French Third Republic to the Depression of 1873--1896 and examines why Germany raised tariffs before France despite similar economic problems and despite similar societal pressures for protection.; The conclusions which the study reaches are mixed. With regard to tariffs, the quantitative tests show that bicameralism and (in the post-war era) divided government in presidential systems are associated with smaller changes in tariff rates. Presidentialism (in the post-war period) and coalition governments (in the inter-war period), however, are associated with larger changes in tariffs. With regard to non-tariff barriers, presidentialism is associated with smaller changes in tariff rates. The qualitative tests show that federalism and bicameralism (in Germany) and electoral laws (in France) hindered efforts at tariff reform. Coalition governments of parties representing farmers and industrialists, however, promoted logrolling that produced changes in tariffs beyond what any one coalition partner favored.