| Do states acquire reputations in international politics? Although most of the existing literature focuses on resolve reputations in a deterrence context, this dissertation considers whether states can acquire reputations as aggressive military powers. It attempts to improve on balance-of-threat theory, which claims that states balance against perceived aggressiveness, yet lacks of theory of perception. For this purpose, I borrow from social-psychology, and in particular attribution theory. I derive the prediction that when the state harms the wellbeing of another (e.g., through invasion or brutal occupation) it subsequently earns an aggressive reputation. I also derive the prediction that a state can earn an aggressive reputation by expanding in the face of clear situational pressures to retrench. Reputation is defined as pre-existing beliefs about a state's intentions or disposition used to predict future behavior. A second implication developed from balance-of-threat theory is that the state with an aggressive reputation has an incentive to reassure others to ward off counter-balancing behavior.; For cases, this dissertation examines Japan in Asia since World War II, and the Soviet Union/Russia in Asia from the 1970s to the present. It concludes that harming others (e.g. by committing aggression) or expanding in the face of clear counter-veiling situational pressures can indeed cause a sticky reputation for malevolence subsequently to form, and that this reputation can be costly. The socialized state with an aggressive reputation (Japan, and the Soviet Union after 1985) responds by attempting to improve its reputation by reassuring others. I have also uncovered a link with regional security multilateralism: Japan and the Soviet Union/Russia have been the most enthusiastic supporters, because multilateral venues can prove valuable for reassurance. On the other hand, the unsocialized state (the Soviet Union before 1985) either shows no regard for its reputation or else tries to exploit an aggressive reputation to intimidate others. In either case, the result is the same: other states are provoked to form an overwhelming counter-balancing coalition against the unsocialized state. |
