Self-positing and mutual recognition: Fichte's theory of self-consciousness

J. G. Fichte developed a theory of self-consciousness that argues mutual recognition and embodiment are necessary conditions of self-conscious thought. Philosophers tend to consider Fichte's theory of apperception independently of his ideas about recognition and embodiment. I argue that Fichte's views on recognition and embodiment are essential to his theory of self-consciousness. I defend three reasons why. First, self-consciousness requires awareness of oneself as an individual. Fichte argues individuality is a normative status that is constituted by acts of mutual recognition. Hence, self-consciousness requires recognition. Secondly, Fichte argues that self-consciousness is realized through a developmental process, or education. The central concept of his developmental theory is what he calls the "summons," a call by one subject to another to exercise its free self-activity, the activity Fichte claims is basic to self-conscious thought. A condition of the summons' efficacy is mutual recognition, so the realization of self-consciousness requires mutual recognition. Thirdly, for Fichte, self-consciousness is an awareness of oneself as willing, and since a condition of willing, I argue, is embodiment, then self-consciousness requires embodiment. To set up my analysis of intersubjectivity in Fichte, I develop an analysis of his view of self-positing and establish that his theory of mind is not solipsistic, since it requires the existence of the external world and other minds. Recent work in philosophy of mind is beginning to examine the role recognition and embodiment play in mental life. My dissertation provides not only a historical contribution to this investigation, but also a conceptual framework to consider these issues that is highly relevant to contemporary debates.