| Direct reference theory has been criticized for not being able to explain the cognitive difference between 'a = a' and 'a = b' and therefore ignoring the importance of modes of presentation. In this dissertation, I examine how some direct reference theorists deal with this criticism.; Howard Wettstein claims that cognitive significance is not an issue of semantics. He argues that those semanticists who are concerned about modes of presentation are the ones who are trapped by what he calls "intentionality intuitions." I examine Wettstein's view and argue that his claims come from a misunderstanding of Frege's puzzle and that the direct reference theorists cannot ignore modes of presentation.; Nathan Salmon distinguishes semantically encoded information from pragmatically imparted information. According to Salmon, the semantic content of a sentence is the former and the mode under which the speaker (or the subject of the sentence) takes the proposition is the latter. He claims that because of a kind of Gricean implicature, we tend to confuse these two types of information. Implicature plays an important role of explaining our intuitions. Upon evaluation, I conclude that his implicature doesn't fit into Grice's original picture of implicature.; Michael Devitt proposes a view that is a compromise between the Fregean theory and the direct reference theory. According to Devitt, a name has two meanings: its referent and its d-chain (designation chain) sense. Unlike Fregean senses, Devitt's d-chain senses do not have the problems that Kripke, Putnam and Donnellan have pointed out. And it is these d-chain senses that incorporate modes of presentation into semantics in a way that matches our intuitions. I review and examine Devitt's causal theory and argue that there is no convincing reason to posit d-chain senses.; What alternative is left for direct reference theory? Perhaps rather than searching for a new kind of sense or implicature, a further analysis of belief may be needed. I think that Salmon's analysis of belief as a ternary relation of an agent, a proposition and a guise might lead us to a potential solution. |
