Deterrence and clarity: United States security policy in the Asian-Pacific, 1950--1970

I argue that most previous work in the field of rational deterrence ignores or understates the importance of declaratory policy. In keeping with the traditional literature, I hold that the success of deterrence is a function of the credibility of the deterrent threat; however, I advance a somewhat different formulation of credibility by explaining it as a combination of the balance of capabilities and interests between the challenger and defender, conditioned by contextual risk propensity. I assert that risk propensity is most important when information on the balance of capabilities and interests is either unavailable or reveals relative equality between challenger and defender. In either of these cases, uncertainty is increased. By looking to the declaratory policy of a defender, uncertainty can be reduced. By including rather than ignoring the impact of declaratory policy, I provide what I argue is a more accurate understanding of deterrence that has important prescriptive implications for policy-makers. After explaining the theory in some detail, I provide a summary of how I seek to measure risk propensity by using a psychologically based approach rather than the expected utility approach more common to political science models. Based on the motivated and unmotivated biases identified by Jervis (1976) and on prospect theory as developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1982; 1984; 1992) and applied by McDermott (1998), I employ a contextual, individually based determination of risk propensity.; I test this theory against a series of crises in the Asian Pacific from 1950 through 1970 in which the United States attempted to deter behavior by different autocratic states. Each crisis is discussed in depth with assessments provided of the significant factors suggested by the theory. The final chapter analyzes these assessments to determine whether there is empirical support for the theory presented.