Redefining citizenship: Illegal immigrants as voters in India and Malaysia

My dissertation, "Redefining Citizenship: Illegal Immigrants as Voters in India and Malaysia," challenges the leading theories of immigration, which are written to account for patterns and problems arising in developed countries when migrants from developing countries flow in. However, this dissertation is grounded on the fact that many more international migrants move to developing countries than to developed countries and the capacity to control immigration and incentives for favoring it are radically different in developing countries. The alternative theory that I elaborate in my dissertation addresses the question of how illegal immigrants gain access to citizenship and acquire the right to vote. The leading theories of international migration and citizenship tell us that citizenship rights---especially the suffrage---only become available to immigrants at the end of a process of incorporation that culminates in naturalization. Yet, in developing countries, many illegal immigrants vote without going through this process: a phenomenon that contradicts everything the leading immigration and citizenship theories would have us expect. To solve this conundrum, my theory points out the central role that documents play in the electoral and economic incorporation of those illegal immigrants who move between developing countries. Within my theory, I construct a model of illegal immigrant incorporation that explains the process by which illegal immigrants come to exercise citizenship rights. I introduce the concept of "documentary citizenship" to explain how incorporation of illegal immigration is facilitated. In order to test the theory, I examine two empirical cases of illegal immigration: Bangladeshis moving to India and Filipinos (and Indonesians) moving to Malaysia. Here I demonstrate the impact of illegal immigration on the politics of voting and how this role of a "citizen" is acquired by illegal immigrants. I show the strategic play with illegality where there is a coalition of interests among federal forces and illegal immigrant groups who are precariously placed against regional anti-immigrant forces. I conclude by speculating on the generalizability and implications of my theory for other developing countries, leaving it for future researchers to test its applicability in a wider set of cases.