Adrift in a sea of sand: The search for United States foreign policy toward the decolonization of Algeria, 1942--1962

This dissertation examines the long struggle of the United States to deal with the questions of the decolonization of Algeria and the postwar struggle of nationalist movements for independence from European empires. By examining the specific case of the development and implementation of United States foreign policy regarding the Algerian war of independence, this dissertation underlines the broader implications of United States policy toward decolonization and the ramifications of the policy of drift. By examining the records of the National Archives as well as presidential and university libraries, a detailed account of the process of United States policymaking combines with an assessment of the underlying ideas and theories which framed policymakers' decisions and indecisions regarding the decolonization of Algeria. Even prior to the direct involvement of the United States in North Africa during World War II, United States policymakers confronted the reality of Algerian nationalism and found themselves unable or unwilling to construct a clear and comprehensive policy toward the end of European empire. With the emergence of an armed struggle against French colonialism in Algeria, these problems came into clear focus. American policies regarding containment, decolonization, and national liberation movements in the Third World converge in the Algerian question. Because of its long duration, this war offers an opportunity to examine the continuity of American foreign policy, the pliability of that policy, and the changes in the policy from the Eisenhower administration to the Kennedy administration. While the Cold War and the policy of containment maintained its sway over United States policymakers, the challenges of the non-aligned movement, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism, and African socialism dwarfed the direct threat of the Soviet Union in North Africa and Algeria. In the face of these challenges and a series of global crises, a disturbing continuity emerges in United States policy toward decolonization; a deliberate policy to avoid decision and to drift along. This dissertation explores the reasons for this drift, the impact of such a policy on the Algerian war and the larger Third World, and attempts to draw lessons from this important era in world history.