Race and foreign policy: The case of Trinidad and Tobago, 1962--1994

This dissertation examines two cases of foreign policy-making in Trinidad: nonintervention into Grenada in 1983; and the decision to intervene into Haiti in 1994. The argument is that the foreign policy decisions can be explained in part by the rearticulation of racial identities of domestic racial groups. The change in identity arises from two domestic crises in race relations: the 1970 Black Power Revolution; and the 1990 attempted coup of Abu Bakr. These crises lead to the formation of new interests that foreign policy decision-making elites must consider in their attempts to maintain stable domestic race relations. Therefore, foreign policy decision-makers must consider racial groups' interests from the domestic realm as well as interests in the international and regional environment when setting policy.; A racial identity framework was designed as an interpretive tool to facilitate the investigation into how racial group interests enter into the foreign policy decision-making equation. When applied to the first case of foreign policy decision-making, the analysis showed that the Prime Minister's decision of nonintervention was opposed by blacks and tacitly approved of by Indians. Thus, the first case does not support my contention that decision-makers must consider the interests arising from racial identities. Social conflict could have been avoided had the Prime Minister been more astute in examining domestic race relations. In the second case, the Prime Minister's decision to intervene was supported by middle-class blacks and Indians, but black opposition came along class lines. Therefore, this case provides evidence to support the argument in this dissertation. Since the Prime Minister's decision reflected the domestic interests of blacks and Indians, social conflict was avoided.