| This dissertation examines the relationship between violent mass mobilization, elite response, and democratization in Indonesia from 1997--2000. It argues that violent mass mobilization was a necessary condition for a successful transition to democracy because of the absence of an organized democratic opposition during the period of President Suharto's sultanistic rule. Other factors helping in the initial stages of the transition were the moderation of the opposition elite, which persuaded incumbent regime officials that they could negotiate a transition with the opposition, and a divided military, which was weak and relatively unthreatened by the moderation of the pro-democracy leaders.;The interaction of these three factors---violent mass mobilization, a moderate opposition elite, and a divided military---resulted in a transition that was mass driven with elite negotiations that focused narrowly on removing Suharto from office and enabling democratic elections to take place. It did not, however, raise critical larger issues such as basic reform of the authoritarian 1945 Constitution and of the pattern of highly centralized government control over an ethnically and geographically diverse country. In consequence, after the transition, violent mass mobilization continued, leading to a constitutional crisis, the threat of national disintegration, and the politicization of Islam.;This dissertation contributes to the theoretical literature on the consequences of characteristics of pre-transition regimes and of transitional periods, specifically varying types of mass-elite connections and the nature of negotiations between opposition and regime elites. The problems associated with achieving and consolidating a transition to democracy from the regime type of sultanism are examined in detail. It also addresses current scholarly debates on the causes and consequences of inter-religious and ethnic violence and the politicization of Islam in the context of democratization. |
