| This dissertation investigates the role that personality, ideology, and advisors play in explaining whether and at what rate political leaders change their attitudes and policy predispositions toward an international enemy in response to new information about their opponent, or about international and domestic conditions. It focuses on four hardline Israeli Prime Ministers---Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Shamir, and Benjamin Netanyahu. All were initially against recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and against the creation of a Palestinian state, but only Rabin and Peres changed their image of the PLO and advocated its recognition. These analyses are complemented by looking at a dramatic case of the reverse, President Carter becoming more hardline toward the Soviet Union during his Administration.; The analysis refutes the main alternative explanation that leaders react to the changes in the regional environment and in the opponent similarly. It also refutes the generalization that hardliners necessarily have to be replaced for change to occur. Rather, it finds that only hardliners who adhere to ideologies which have specific components that act as obstacles to change, and who have an orientation toward the past, may need to be replaced for dramatic policy changes to take place.; This dissertation argues that certain ideological and personality factors will facilitate a change in image of the opponent. The analysis suggests that in order for a leader to change his image of an enemy, changes in the opponent and in the environment are necessary, but that a combination of three additional elements act as sufficient causes: (1) either a weak link to an ideology or adherence to an ideology which does not have the components articulated as obstacles; (2) a present or future individual time orientation; and (3) either a flexible cognitive system or exposure to a significant advisor with different views of the opponent. These findings indicate that a change in enemy image is not always necessary for changes in policy preference, but creates sharper and deeper changes in policy preferences. |
