Unconditional surrender: The origins and consequences of a wartime policy

This study critically examines the origins and consequences of the Allied policy of unconditional surrender in World War II. The study begins with an assessment of unconditional surrender theoretically defined, tying it both to Just War tradition and the problems of war termination. The first section also identifies the background of the policy with specific reference to the person most closely linked to its formulation: Franklin Roosevelt. The domestic and international responsibilities borne by him plus the peculiarities of his leadership style are additionally evaluated.; The dissertation next analyzes unconditional surrender as applied first to Italy, followed by Germany, ending with Japan. The part on Italy stresses Roosevelt's determination to keep the policy both vague and inflexible. The German section looks to the nature of British policy and its relationship to Roosevelt's thinking. That section also examines the troubling question of whether the Allied war was aimed at an entire nation or was more narrowly (and properly) focused on the Nazi government. Finally, the German section scrutinizes the stance assumed by the German military high command, as well as the debatable merits of the Morgenthau Plan that developed as a definition of what unconditional surrender meant to the Germans. The Japan section is focused primarily on questions related to the institution of the emperor in the post war world, and how and why the war was truncated by the use of atomic weapons in August 1945.; In sum, the policy of unconditional surrender was wanting in all respects. It failed both the tests of morality and military-diplomatic logic. Supposedly based on the tenets of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, the policy abused the moral concepts espoused in those solemn statements. Contrary to the requirements of Just War theory, unconditional surrender prolonged the war's duration and added to the suffering and costs of the conflict.; The Allies won the war because of brute power: primarily Russian blood and American industrial strength. The war was won despite the unconditional surrender goal, and notwithstanding the erosion of Allied moral advantage caused by Roosevelt's insistence on an extravagant policy.