| In this dissertation, I argue for and specify the causal impact of policy ideas and ideological legacies in the making of American grand strategy, broadly conceived to include political, military and economic commitments abroad. I compare and contrast three cases of change or potential change in the nature and extent of America's international commitments: first, the rejection of U.S. membership in the League of Nations; second, the origins of containment; and third, the post-Cold War era. Through a controlled comparison of these cases, and through the competitive testing of three alternative theories centered on international power, domestic coalition interests, and ideology, I attempt to answer a number of general questions. First, when and why does American grand strategy change? Second, how do policy ideas or paradigms relating to grand strategy shape strategic outcomes? And third, how does American classical liberal ideology influence these same outcomes?; In answer to the first question, I suggest that neither international pressures nor economic interests can fully explain or predict the actual strategic outcomes in any of these three cases. I use counterfactuals to argue that each outcome was as much due to the power of certain ideological legacies as it was a response to material constraints and incentives. On the second question, I show that ideas about grand strategy have an impact on policy outcomes primarily through processes of agenda setting and coalition building on the part of leading state officials. On the third question, I contend that American liberal ideology acts as filter on strategic options and ideas, ruling out pure 'balance of power' behavior. After building a model of strategic change, I apply that model to current policy debates. By referring to the power of entrenched policy ideas, and the role of ideology, I make some suggestions as to why American grand strategy has so far shown considerable continuity with the Cold War era, and predict when and why it might change. |
