The Limits Of China’s Grand Strategy

On September 7,2013,when President Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan,he proposed the 21st Century Silk Road,also known as the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI).In the same year,at the APEC forum in Indonesia on October 2,Xi Jinping also proposed to establishment of a new international organization:the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB).The purpose of these two Chinese initiatives is not only simply in response to the United States’ rebalance policy undertaken by the Obama administration,but also to stimulate rapid economic development of the entire Asian region through infrastructure investment projects.As China’s grand strategy,the BRI and AIIB have created a wave of scholarly research within the field of political science.These academic efforts focus on topics such as how these two initiatives may alter the world order and the contribution of multilateral institutions on developing countries.In general,the academic community has held a positive attitude on China’s grand strategy,especially on potential impact that this strategy can have on international politics.In other words,scholars believe that China’s grand strategy may very well have a large impact on global politics and the international economy.However,this one-sided view can obscure certain preconditions to the success of China’s grand strategy.Therefore,the research objective and focus of this paper is to undertake a more comprehensive approach by focusing on the limitations of China’s two initiatives.The research questions that this paper attempts to answer is:What are the political constraints of the BRI and AIIB?What are the implications of these restrictions on China’s rise?First,this paper provides a clear definition of the term grand strategy.Wang Jisi hinted a definition of China’s grand strategy in his article "China’s Search for a Grand Strategy:A Rising Power Finds its Way".Wang puts forward that the transformation of China’s four strategic thoughts is the foundation of the new grand strategy:economic development,transformation in foreign policy,the transformation of the concept of security,and the change of Chinese values in the international community.The implementation of the BRI by China and the establishment of the AIIB are the epitome of the definition described by Wang Jisi.With this definition in hand,this paper then analyzes the literature surrounding China’s grand strategy.Although each school of thought makes a plausible argument regarding China’s grand strategy,the literature does not mention or further explore the limits of China’s BRI and/or the AIIB and the responses of international community regarding these two initiatives.Therefore,this paper uses the AIIB as a primary example to discuss why it is important to analyze the limitations of China’s grand strategy.As an essential part of China’s grand strategy,the AIIB is essential for upholding China’s image in the international community as a global power.However,the political constraints of this international organization are obvious.Although the AIIB is a reflection of the rise of China and has an important role in the country’s grand strategy,especially given that this multilateral development bank is led by China,the AIIB faces key restrictions.China cannot fully control the AIIB despite having veto power over investment projects.Moreover,investment from the AIIB can is supplementary to development investment as opposed to posing as a threat to the investment power of other international organizations.Lastly,China’s AIIB is not a world order altering institutions,instead the AIIB has slowly followed the already established international norms.These three restrictions of the AIIB can refute the more optimistic views that scholars have about China’s grand strategy.At the same time,the restrictions of the AIIB prove that China’s overall strategy needs to be further understood and analyzed,especially when the attitudes of different countries towards BRI are not a given.Thus,the research and analysis on the restriction of the BRI is the innovative element placed forth by this paper.This paper uses a Large-n quantitative study undertaken by Shaofeng Chen in "Regional Responses to China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative in Southeast Asian" as the basis of the process-tracking methodology implemented.The hypothesis states that domestic politics will affect India and Myanmar’s attitude towards the BRI.Domestic politics is the independent variable and a country’s attitude toward the BRI is the dependent variable.The causal mechanism is broken down into two domestic political factors:the policy preferences and ideology of the ruling elite and the public opinion and the trust of society in China.After testing for the hypothesis,the evidence demonstrates that both Myanmar and India’s attitude towards the BRI is influenced by the policy preferences and ideology of the ruling elite and the public opinion as well as the trust of society in China.With regards to India,after the Singh to Modi transition,the country’s attitude towards the BRI experienced a great change.When the Modi government took office,India’s political ideology had also changed drastically,particularly because the Modi government has placed more emphasis on a strong and self-sufficient India that plays a more important role in the international community.While the Modi administration changed the country’s political ideology,India’s foreign policy also experienced a change,especially in its attitude towards the BRI.Currently,India remains wary of the BRI and unwilling to play a more active role in the initiative.At the same time,India is pursuing its "Act East" policy to improve its international role and influence in South and Southeast Asia.On the other hand,although Myanmar has had a special relationship with China historically,the country has recently begun to undergo a change in its regime which has affected its foreign policy.In 2010,President Deng Sheng emphasized the importance of military interests as the core for Myanmar’s democratization efforts.However,during the presidency of Deng Sheng,public participation began to change the government’s attitude towards China.The two major examples that embody this change in foreign policy are public outrage towards the Myitsone Dam project and the changes in the contract of the Lepaton copper mine project.These two instances best exemplify how public participation and opinion have shaped the government’s foreign policy from welcoming Chinse investment to being warier of receiving such investment.In addition,the election of 2015 in which the citizens of Myanmar elected the National League for Democracy to incumbency,Myanmar’s foreign policy toward China was solidified.Myanmar is currently pursuing a multi-country hedging strategy that has hedged Myanmar away from China and begin to hedge towards other global powers such as the US and India.Altogether,this paper demonstrates that policy preferences along with the ideology of the ruling elite and public opinion as well as society’s trust in China affect the perception of the BRI held by India and Myanmar.