Conflicting choices: Why Titoism in Yugoslavia but not in China (The Truman Administration's policy in China and Yugoslavia through 1949)

A predominant ingredient in American foreign policy for half of the Twentieth Century was the containment of Communism, personified by the Soviet Union's acquisition and control of adjacent lands. This challenge took visible and intimidating shape as World War Two ended and the Truman Administration began. In retrospect, it is possible to accord the Presidency of Harry S. Truman recognition for a vigorous, intelligent and basically successful foreign policy—in Europe, if not in most of Asia. Explanations for this dichotomy become evident in a study of the process and difficulties of the Truman Administration's efforts in China and Yugoslavia.; In its initial confrontation with the relatively unfamiliar Balkan nation, the Administration had to deal with its rapid metamorphosis from a presumptive ally into an aggressively hostile Communist dictatorship presumably ensconced in the Communist Bloc. The ruler propelling these changes, Joseph Broz Tito, had successfully eliminated all royal and democratic opposition and was not only solidifying his hold on his newly created Federal Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia [FPRY], but was also attempting to extend his borders into Italian and Austrian territory. When Tito's hubris activated his unique expulsion from the Communist satellite system in 1948, however, his subsequent need for survival allowed Acheson's State Department to formulate a tentative détente which successfully protected the FPRY`s “non-aligned” position.; In contrast, the United State long involvement in China had endowed Washington with an ample source of knowledgeable and concerned diplomatic personnel for that area, but—also a highly evolved amalgamation of powerful vested interests devoted to the protection of Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang's [GMD]. Chiang's moribund government had proved incapable of revitalization despite enormous quantities of American economic and military aid. Nevertheless, powerful American proponents, waving the banner of anti-Communism, insisted on Washington's support for its continued existence against its vigorous and increasingly successful Communist rival. As a result, the Truman Administration's attempts to stabilize the turmoil in China were disabled by a perpetual bombardment of financial, political, personal and international demands—and somewhere in this maelstrom the ability to pursue an effective China policy was lost.