| This study examines how seven modern presidents selected nominees to the United States Supreme Court. During the past half century, these appointments have become high-stake public events. Interest group activity, media attention, and divided government have significantly constrained the politics of choosing justices. Presidential discretion in this context depends on executive management styles, the abilities of subordinates who exercise delegated authority, and the unique political circumstances surrounding each vacancy.The research concentrates on the nomination process in 28 case studies from 1945 through 1988. The data derive from the papers of seven presidents and interviews with 25 participants in the selection system, including President Gerald Ford and four former attorneys general (Herbert Brownell, William Rogers, Nicholas Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark).Several important patterns emerge. (1) Presidents have utilized three models in picking justices: personal, partial delegation and full delegation. Democratic presidents (Truman and Johnson especially) favored the personal model to dominate nominations. Republican presidents preferred some form of delegation. (2) Some confirmation defeats (Carswell, Ginsburg and Bork) resulted from inadequate homework and vetting of candidates by executive officials. Anticipation of Senate opposition, in turn, influenced subsequent nominations. (3) Recent presidents have adopted a strategy of choosing competent, confirmable jurists from the federal circuits to reduce conflict in the increasingly public and politicized process of appointing justices.This work is grounded on three premises. (1) Because the Constitution distributes power in the appointment process, presidential nominations and Senate confirmation are linked in a seamless web. (2) Public attention and scholarly inquiry have focused mostly on Senate confirmation battles, thus neglecting the initial nomination phase. (3) Schattschneider's theorem postulates a continuing struggle between the tendencies toward privatization and socialization of political conflict. A privatized process with few decision points maximizes presidential discretion. A socialized process with many decision points reduces presidential control over decisions and their outcomes. |
