'Devouring all our resources': Britain, the Army, and strategic sufficiency in the Far East, 1947-1954

In 1947, the British defense establishment crafted a long-term strategy that gave strategic priority to the defense of the West over less strategically vital areas of the Commonwealth. But in 1950 the British were forced to modify this strategy following redeployment of substantial forces to meet contingencies in Malaya, Hong Kong, and Korea and the emergence of Communist China. Yet contrary to conventional scholarly interpretation that Britain became strategically overextended in the first decade of the Cold War, a thorough examination of primary source documents clearly shows that the Far East from 1947 to 1954 was the period and place in which Britain's global military strategy was tested, adjusted, and proven correct.; By the end of 1954, the number of British units in the Far East was only slightly higher than had originally been envisioned in 1947, despite numerous theater contingencies. The British achieved strategic sufficiency in several ways. First, colonial and Dominion troops began to relieve some British and Gurkha units for service elsewhere and Australia and New Zealand accepted a greater share of wartime responsibility for the region. Second, with the special exception of Korea, the British limited further military involvement in the region by declining American and French requests for military intervention in Indochina. Lastly, they succeeded in covering their Far Eastern commitments with security arrangements with the United States, the Commonwealth, and Asian allies. Britain thus was able to keep its forces in the Far East at the lowest possible level consonant with its military, legal and moral obligations, while preserving its ability to contribute to the defense of the West.