| With the end of the Cold War, US policy makers could reconsider past allocation of national resources, including those devoted to defense. The defense drawdown of the early 1990s, however, was more limited than experts anticipated. In fact, the immediate post-Cold War era witnessed only a minor rollback of the Reagan buildup in most categories. Evidence suggests limited reductions were due to opposition by a segment of the US defense community who blindly subscribe to the "war-fighter" perspective on international relations. This dissertation examines why and how these "Blind Hawks" opposed fundamental change in the US defense structure, budget, and purpose following the collapse of the USSR.;The dissertation finds that economic interests typically affect the perceptions and policy recommendations of defense industrialists, grassroots pro-defense groups, and some members of Congress. Institutional interests more frequently influence military and civilian defense policy maker perceptions and recommendations. However, ideology consistently affects a broad cross section of Blind Hawks. This ideology contains a particular set of beliefs and values related to national security: that military might is the primary (perhaps even sole) basis of US influence, that conflict between nation-states is inevitable, and that there always will be a militarily powerful state hostile to the United States. Combined, Blind Hawk interests and ideology have distorted perceptions of the nature of threats to US national security. As a result, Blind Hawks have managed to preserve a huge Cold War military infrastructure that serves its interests and ideology but wastes scarce national resources.;Many scholars claim the defense community acts out of economic and/or bureaucratic self-interest. This dissertation argues such factors only partially explain Blind Hawk behavior. Those persons also appear motivated by a distinct set of values and beliefs. The dissertation explicates Blind Hawk interests and ideology with three case studies: the War Scare of 1948; the Team B experiment of 1976, and the 1985-1990 debate over Gorbachev's intentions. It then draws on events from the post-Cold War era to show how Blind Hawk interests and ideology, formed during the Cold War, continue to operate. |
