Constitutional theory and war powers in the post-Cold War era: Structural argument and contemporary policy

Structuralist interpretation of the Constitution can offer a new and needed perspective in reassessing the war powers of the President and Congress in light of the end of the Cold War, and provide an important contribution to assessments of proposed war powers policy.;This dissertation proposes the use of a structuralist approach to interpret the United States Constitution to develop a model for war powers theory and policy in the post-Cold War age.;A discussion of the development of the powerful presidency in the Cold War era and the framing and subsequent failure of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 introduces the study as a way of examining and evaluating contemporary interpretational approaches based on executive dominance and legislative reaction.;This is followed by an examination of the methodology used in the study. Structuralist argument will be defined and discussed. Application of the structuralist approach through the building of a model for war powers will demonstrate the viability of the method and will provide a prospective model for the introduction of military force in foreign settings--one that will be based on foundational principles of the Constitution: checks and balances, representation, and accountability.;Application of the structuralist model will focus on contemporary policy including the War Powers Act of 1973, challenges to presidential power in the 1980s and the recently debated "Peace Powers Act of 1995" and "National Security Revitalization Act.".