Peace, rivalry, and war: A theoretical and empirical study of international conflict

This dissertation examines why some major power rivalries escalate to war and others come to resolve their conflicts peacefully. This study employs multiple theoretical frameworks to inform empirical tests of international peace and conflict. The works of Paine, Kant, and Rousseau are developed to clarify several perennial debates between cosmopolitans, liberals, and realists regarding war and peace. Relying on these three frameworks, divergent predictions regarding alliance-making and arms buildups are tested in cases of major power rivalry since 1816. First, the chapters on arms build-ups cast doubt on the often-cited relationship between high military spending and escalation of militarized disputes. These findings also explain the sources of the Diehl-Wallace debate over the impact of arms races on the escalation of militarized disputes. In the second empirical section, the chapters on alliance formation and major power war demonstrate new and significant findings. These findings emerge from a new data-set that specifically identifies those alliances that have explicitly targeted a third state. The findings support liberal models of international conflict spirals while casting doubt on realist models of peace through strength and enhanced deterrence.