The minimum role of external agents in administrative reform: The case of USAID-Egypt

The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the role of external agents in administrative reform of developing countries' bureaucracies given the complex political, environments characterizing intervention and implementation attempts. It conceptualizes a new model for continuity and reform forces on administrative reform in developing countries placed by both the external agents and the recipient governments. The research answers four questions: (1) can a recipient government through its bureaucracy directly constrain the efforts of external agents' contractors for administrative reform; (2) can a recipient government through politic and economic strategies indirectly constrain the external agents' reform efforts; (3) can external agents indirectly through political and economic forces positively influence administrative reform; and (4) can external agents through contractors directly influence the social and cultural aspects of bureaucracy toward administrative reform.;The case used to empirically test the model involves the role of USAID and Black and Veatch contractors in reforming the Egyptian bureaucracy and the General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply. The long-term relationship between the political actors and the significance and dynamics of strategic and economic variables involved in the case study provide a reliable foundation for generalizing the results to other international development cases.;Several data collection methods were employed. First, elite interviewing was conducted with public and private officials in Cairo and Washington to assess the significance and direction of continuity and reform forces. Second, a survey of Egyptian bureaucrats was administrated and the results were compared with a 1983 survey to measure the impact of administrative reform efforts. Third, a review of documents at government and newspapers archives in Cairo and Washington was conducted to elicit information about the interplay of administrative, political, and economic variables between both sides of the relationship over the studied period of time.;Findings suggest that: (1) the significant presence of an external agent with a social and economic development strategy in a developing country does not necessarily enhance the country's administrative capacity; (2) domestic and international political pressures can interplay to create a window of opportunity for reform and place sufficient forces on a regime to adopt a certain degree of administrative reform; (3) political and economic interests of external agents outweigh the benefits of administrative reform's positive impact on development when designing involvement strategies; and (4) consultant firms contracted by external agents to implement reform policies have a limited authority for administrative reform in the absence of sufficient support from other political actors. Thus, this detailed analysis of the Egyptian-USAID relationship indicates that even with a window of opportunity provided by the regime's political support for administrative reform, the external agent's role is still constrained by limited authority and countervailing political and economic continuity forces.