| Traditional international relations theorizing suggests that cooperation in the international system is limited due to the inability of international actors to commit credibly to future courses of action; in a world characterized by anarchy, uncertainty, and egoism, the benefits and risks of unilateral defection inhibit the formation of mutually beneficial agreements. Yet cooperation under anarchy occurs. Understanding when and how international entities overcome the problems inherent in contracting with no exogenous enforcement mechanism represents one of the most significant challenges for international relations theorists.; In this dissertation, I present a game-theoretic model which explains and predicts the international and domestic political conditions under which self-enforcing agreements are possible, and the conditions under which cooperation can be aided by provisions to an agreement which change the incentives of the negotiating parties. By considering the benefits expected from cooperation, the domestic political incentives faced by the negotiators, and the probability and consequences of an unfulfilled agreement, I draw conclusions about the likelihood of dyadic cooperation and the nature of the agreement. First, I find that the benefits and risks of unilateral defection do not always inhibit the formation of mutually beneficial agreements. Second, I discover that even when the risks of defection are high, agreements can sometimes be constructed which mitigate this risk through provisions which act as guarantors of the agreement. These provisions either increase the credibility of an international actor's commitment to cooperate or increase the willingness of an actor to accept the risk that an agreement will not be fulfilled. International actors can utilize guarantors to create conditions under which they are willing to cooperate when the original conditions preclude cooperative agreements.; I subject hypotheses drawn from the model to empirical test and find evidence commensurate with the theory. The theory developed in this dissertation demonstrates that contracting problems do exist in the international system in varying degrees, but they are not always insurmountable. Stark representations of the limits to cooperation imposed by the international system are overly pessimistic. Through a deductive, formal model I explain when, how, and with whom mutually beneficial cooperation can be established on a dyadic basis. |
