A new integrating point for the world-system consideration and the national-security concern: The United States and Asian non-aligned countries in the late 1950s

In the period of the second term of the Eisenhower administration, a serious challenge from the developing world was the emergence of the non-alignment movement. Particularly in Asia, three newly-independent countries, India, Burma, and Indonesia, spoke for the movement. In order to deal with these non-aligned countries, US policymakers had to adjust their diplomatic approaches to the new circumstances in Asia.; If one regards the world market and the capitalist world's safety as decisive factors in US policymakers' minds, one may conclude that the world system consideration and the security concern were the two dominant themes of US diplomacy in the Cold War period. Largely speaking, in the Cold War years, US diplomacy was a process of searching for an integrating point for the two themes. Also, US diplomacy was a process of utilizing neo-authoritarianism as a more flexible policy-implementation method to replace liberal developmentalism.; The first, or the old, integrating point of the two diplomatic themes was established with the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe. The second, or the new, integrating point of the two themes became a much more difficult task for US policymakers in dealing with Asian non-aligned countries.; Although it proved to be difficult, the Eisenhower administration made important progress in conceptual adjustment. In the case of India, US policymakers accepted the "quasi-membership" position of India in the world system. Also, US officials tolerated India's lukewarm attitude toward US security concerns and made India a marginal companion in South Asia. In the case of Burma, US policymakers shifted from their liberal developmentalism to neo-authoritarianism and waited for an "opportunity" created by the Burmese military for economic take-off. In the case of Indonesia, US policymakers sensed the significance of economic development as an inherent part of neo-authoritarianism. The Eisenhower administration observed the effective rationality of the Indonesian military leaders as administrators of modernization.; The virtue of the new integration in Asia was its flexibility in policy consideration. More importantly, this new integrating point set the general course for the United States to deal with Third World countries in the future.