| This study examines the impact of law and constitutionalism upon military dictatorship in Chile. It reconstructs the legal organization of military rule, the genesis of the 1980 constitution, and the effects of the constitution on military prerogative during 1981-89. Whereas constitutionalism and dictatorship are typically seen as mutually exclusive, this research demonstrates that, beyond the shroud of secrecy, legal-institutional limits did operate within the regime. It also demonstrates that the conventional characterization of military rule in Chile as a monistic dictatorship dominated by General Pinochet is inaccurate. The juridical organization of the dictatorship, the decision to promulgate a constitution, the substance of the constitution, and its permanence are explained by internal divisions among top level officers. On the basis of extensive primary documentation the study reconstructs: internal decision-making processes regarding procedural rules for military rule; the relationship between the military dictatorship and existing organs of constitutional control, such as the Supreme Court and the Contraloria; military regulation of emergency powers in response to international pressure; the conflictive origins of the 1980 constitution; the logic of institutional design embedded in the charter; the impact of the constitution on the organization of military rule and its effects upon the full implementation of the constitution and the 1988 plebiscite, particularly through the operation of the constitutional court. The study demonstrates that the 1980 constitution, drafted and enacted by the military government, limited the regime from structuring the transition to democracy unilaterally at its prerogative. |
