Cournot games with network effects for electric power markets

The electric utility industry is moving from regulated monopolies with protected service areas to an open market with many wholesale suppliers competing for consumer load. This market is typically modeled by a Cournot game oligopoly where suppliers compete by selecting profit maximizing quantities. The classical Cournot model can produce multiple solutions when the problem includes typical power system constraints. This work presents a mathematical programming formulation of oligopoly that produces unique solutions when constraints limit the supplier outputs. The formulation casts the game as a supply maximization problem with power system physical limits and supplier incremental profit functions as constraints. The formulation gives Cournot solutions identical to other commonly used algorithms when suppliers operate within the constraints. Numerical examples demonstrate the feasibility of the theory. The results show that the maximization formulation will give system operators more transmission capacity when compared to the actions of suppliers in a classical constrained Cournot game. The results also show that the profitability of suppliers in constrained networks depends on their location relative to the consumers' load concentration.