Inter Restricted Relationship Study Of Wind Power Enterprises,Thermal Power Enterprises And Power Grid Enterprises Based On Game Theory

In electricity market, wind power enterprises, thermal power enterprises and power grid enterprises belong to different stakeholders, thus a interest conflict exists within the utilization of new energy resources. To study the tripartite interest relationship not only relates to the settlement of the conflict among the participants of wind power integration, further, it will provide supports to policy makers to formulate the market structure of electricity and rules of competition.The output characteristics of wind power is firstly analyzed to point out the interests influence on thermal power enterprises and power grid enterprises with large-scale wind power integration. When it comes to the wind power enterprises and thermal power enterprises in wind-thermal-bundled transmission system, the profit models of the two suppliers, which take the existing renewable energy policy and the operation characteristics of wind farm and thermal generator into account, are respectively established according to the strategies of cooperation or non-cooperation based on game theory, and the decision making of the two power suppliers is analyzed. When they both take non-cooperation strategy, a Cournot model is established to obtain their planning capacity and profits. When they choose cooperation strategy, the influence coefficient which can illustrate the variation of one’s profit influenced by the changing of the other’s strategy is introduced, and based on which the profit distribution plan is presented. When it comes to the enterprises groups of wind power, thermal power and power grid within macro context, the replicator dynamic system of 2 X 2 X 2 asymmetric evolutionary game in three groups is built to simulate the tripartite behaviors according to the payoff matrix based on the bounded rationality assumptions of players. The asymptotic stabilities of all the equilibria are given. Furthermore, the evolutionary result of the three parties without government’s intervention in new energy resources is given, and the condition to achieve the expected state is provided for the government who can carry out policies to change the three parties’profit.The conclusions of this paper has theoretical significance and practical value for ensuring the development of new energy resources, it can give explanations to the difficulty of new energy resources integration and provide a decision-making basis for government in developing new energy policies.