Font Size: a A A

Game Analysis Of Power Plants In Regional Power Market

Posted on:2008-09-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:G LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360215980558Subject:Electrical theory and new technology
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years, the electric power industry has experienced a reformation of deregulation of traditional monopoly and introduced competition all over the world. Thus, some relative theories and technologies in power market open a new and important researching field. The study of applying game theory in power market is one of worthwhile aspects.The meaning of study power plants game theory is to analysis the bidding strategies of power plants and the economy effects under different strategies, and then secure some valuable research findings. The other aim is to provide theoretical supports for deregulating China's present power market, hoping to gain further understanding the reform of Chinese power industry through a theoretical study of bidding models.This paper introduces the background of power market reform and gives a brief account of the exploitation process of foreign power market and the power market reform both at home and abroad. Then expounds the basic theory of economic analysis of power market and presents the power market model which is applicable to our national condition. With pointing out that regional power market is a typical oligarchic market, the author attempts to introduce general methods for applying oligarchic game analysis.Based on oligarchic market, puts forward respectively the Cournot model, in which takes the power quantity as its decision variable, and the Bertrand model, in which considers the power price as its decision variable. The power quantity and the power price are the variable strategies the power plants adopted. Through analyzing the game behaviors by the power plants, make a discussion of the influence on the plants itself and the commercial efficiency in the whole market under different strategies such as cooperation or non-cooperation. In the light of the discussion, the power plants may not only have the motivation of cooperating with others, limiting production and promoting price, monopolizing the market but also worry that other plants break the agreements and obtain higher benefits which lead to the dilemma of whether cooperation or non-cooperation. Meanwhile it offers theoretical basis for the supervisory departments when monitoring and making policies.
Keywords/Search Tags:regional power market, oligarchic game, Cournot model, Stackelberg model, Bertrand model, Nash equilibrium
PDF Full Text Request
Related items