Institutional and contractual relations in international ocean liner shipping

This dissertation consists of three essays. Each essay explores the impact of current policies and proposed policy changes on the international ocean liner shipping industry. This industry has recently been deregulated and will likely be the subject of further policy changes.;The first essay is institutional in nature and addresses key issues facing carriers and shippers in the newly deregulated marketplace. It concludes that carriers are motivated to pursue long-term, large-volume contracts. Such contracts yield efficiency gains. Carriers then share rents with shippers. Some shippers sign large-volume, long-term contracts with carriers on their own. Others decide to join a coalition for the purpose of collective contracting. There are two primary types of coalition active in this industry. Each type is considered.;The second essay is an empirical analysis of the contractual and institutional decisions of exporters of agricultural and forest products from the United States West Coast to Asia. It considers a shipper's decision about whether to contract directly with a carrier or join a coalition. The paper also identifies key differences between types of coalition active in the export of agricultural and forest products. Finally, the paper provides a model of a shipper's conditional choice of type of coalition. Data for the essay was gathered from a survey of exporters. The data is fit to an appropriate discrete choice model.;The third essay presents an economic model of international ocean liner shipping which can be used for assessing the impact of preventing collusion among carriers. The model is based on a Cournot game in which carriers make long-run capacity decisions and prices are determined by short-run price competition. The nature of the equilibria are determined. It is also shown how shippers will be affected by the new equilibria as well as how they might respond to it.