BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: PANACEA OR PANDORA

The ABM debate of the late l960s ultimately terminated on a note of non-acceptance, largely due to technical deficiencies and domestic political resistance. Furthermore, it was not clear that competing with the Soviet Union in this highly expensive arena would necessarily lead to a position of enhanced security for the United States.;In light of the proven U.S. capability for misjudging both the effects of and reactions to past strategic choices, e.g., its initial position in SALT I calling for National Command Authority (NCA) protection only (which the Congress wouldn't endorse) and the decision to proceed with the development and deployment of MIRV (the genesis of the current vulnerability problem), an examination of the possible long-term consequences of BMD deployment is clearly in order. In short, the U.S. calculus of choice should not only incorporate immediate cost-benefit comparisons of defense vs. offense, but also take into account the implications of the longer term action-reaction cycle that is likely to ensue between the United States and the Soviet Union.;It will be the purpose of this dissertation to examine the advisability of BMD deployment in today's context of nuclear parity and to extrapolate from this examination whatever insights might be contained with respect to the more general question of the role of strategic defense in the nuclear age.;Since that time, a number of far-reaching changes have taken place which call into question whether or not the same debate today would have a similar outcome. The perceived vulnerability of the U.S. land-based missile force coupled with state-of-the-art advances in BMD technology strengthen the case for a hard-point missile defense. Moreover, there can be little doubt that such a system would introduce significant uncertainty into Soviet deliberations relating to preemptive attack.