War on the horizon: Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps and British foreign policy during the 1930

The focus of this dissertation is the evolution of British foreign policy towards Germany and France in the decade before the outbreak of World War II. More specifically, the dissertation examines the role Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador to Germany (1933-37) and to France (1937-39), played in the development of British foreign policy. The Foreign Office and Cabinet files were examined, as well as the personal papers of Phipps and others in policy-making positions, in order to determine what information the British Cabinets of the 1930s had at their disposal when making foreign policy decisions. It was found that both the Baldwin and Chamberlain Cabinets were repeatedly warned throughout the 1930s about the dangers of allowing Germany to rearm, but continually refused to take significant action against Germany because they believed British public opinion would not support them. Though Phipps and others suggested in the early and mid-1930s the possibility of using economic sanctions or a pre-emptive strike to force Germany to end its escalating arms build-up, the Cabinet preferred to take what it believed was the politically most expedient course: negotiations with Germany. The evidence examined suggests that decision-making by the British Cabinets was based almost entirely on what they perceived public opinion would support, while the condition of the British economy and military were relatively minor factors.