| The goal of this dissertation is to show that cognitive science, while dealing with the special subject of the mind, can nonetheless fit into the same general model that Bas van Fraassen provides for the natural sciences. The dissertation focuses specifically on the nature of explanation in the cognitive sciences.;Chapter One ("Cognitive Science") makes clear what I take cognitive science to be in the work. The two central cases here are Noam Chomsky's theory of generative syntax, and David Marr's computational theory of vision. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to setting out the structure of the two theories, in order to provide concrete case studies in the sorts of explanations they give.;Chapter Two ("Questions and Explanations") sets out the model of explanation employed by considering the relative virtues of several recent approaches--Hempel's classic D-N model, Salmon's statistical relevance model, and Stalnaker and Lewis' counterfactual approach--and concluding with van Fraassen's pragmatics-oriented model. Like many accounts, van Fraassen's takes explanations to be answers to "Why?" questions, and emphasizes the pragmatic machinery at work in question-asking.;Chapter Three ("Two Views of Explanation in Cognitive Science") considers two influential views of explanation in cognitive science. Such explanations are often said to be functional (teleological) or dispositional. I look at proposals of each sort and argue that none of the explanatory strategies singled out can count as the central one in cognitive scientific explanation, because cognitive science has no central explanatory strategy.;In Chapter Four ("Theory, Explanation, and Abstract Objects") I hold instead that cognitive science uses all the relevance relations found in natural science. The odd features of cognitive scientific explanation turn instead around the sorts of objects and processes that get posited in its theories--abstract, multiply-instantiable objects that can act as representations, and abstract processes of transformation on these objects. I do not, then, deny that we get new sorts of explanation in cognitive science--only that the source of this novelty has been properly located. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)... |
