A THEORY OF MEANING AFTER THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

One undercurrent in contemporary philosophical thought is the suspicion that the traditional search for final and absolute answers is no longer possible. This dissertation, "A Theory of Meaning After the End of Philosophy", discusses some of the consequences of this view, specifically those which the French philosopher Jacques Derrida draws from it. The first is that any search for final and absolute answers will necessarily fall within what he calls the "metaphysics of presence". The second is that the role of the context in our understanding of language is much greater than is usually believed and, as a corollary, that the role of the individual Subject in "speech acts" is much less important. These views are compared to those of John Searle, because Searle and Derrida seem to share certain important premises and because Searle's work seems to provide a theory of meaning which Derrida himself does not provide, and which does not fall within Derrida's "metaphysics of presence".;Starting with intentionality, which Searle considers to be the basis for any complete account of language, the second chapter presents his theory of meaning. Following the logical, rather than chronological, progression of his thought a full account of his view on meaning is derived, with special emphasis on the role of individual intentionality and of the context, to show more clearly where Searle agrees and disagrees with Derrida. Then, Searle's theory of meaning is compared with the traditional theories against which Derrida argues, especially with regard to truth and what Searle calls the "background".;Given the conclusions of these two chapters, the third chapter establishes that Searle's theory of meaning does fulfill the criteria for an account of meaning which is not only compatible with Derrida's requirements but also philosophically similar to Derrida's own position. The work of Martin Heidegger provides a basis for exploring the key premises common to Derrida and Searle. Then the important issues are isolated from the incidental ones in the direct confrontation of views drawn from the "debate" between Searle and Derrida carried on in Glyph. Given the premises they share, it follows that Searle's work does not necessarily fall within the "closure of the metaphysics of presence". Moreover, the residual differences between Searle and Derrida appear to be due, at least in part, to the different intellectual contexts within which they find themselves. More importantly, however, these remaining issues seem to be based on divergent responses to a question concerning the priority of public norms and individual intentionality which neither Searle nor Derrida can consistently ask or answer.;In this context, the dissertation analyzes Derrida and Searle's writings, as well as Searle's most recent thought as presented in his lectures. The first chapter presents an explanation of Derrida's position and his terminology. The analysis of terms such as 'metaphysics', 'difference', 'writing', 'trace', and 'presence' as they are used by Derrida yields something like necessary and sufficient conditions according to which a philosophical theory could be said to fall within the "metaphysics of presence". The use of these necessary and sufficient conditions is illustrated in two examples of how Derrida deconstructs texts to show their metaphysical nature. The chapter ends with a discussion of Derrida's account of the role of the context and of the Subject in language and in intentionality in general.