| The dissertation examines several theoretic and empirical issues in resource and environmental economics.; Chapter One of this dissertation discusses a dynamic trade problem of a resource-scarce and capital-short open economy. In this economy, exhaustible resources are traded for foreign capital. Different from previous researches on the similar topics, we allow for endogenous export revenue. The optimal trade behavior of the economy is discussed here. The efficiency conditions for the optimal trading under different assumptions are derived. Those conditions are corresponding the famous Hotelling rules in a closed economy. Finally, the policy implications of the results are indicated.; Chapter Two analyses the properties of cumulative public good or externality. The public good represents some major concerns in environmental economics, such as "greenhouse" effect and ozone layer depletion. I set up a theoretic model of cumulative public good which reflects the dynamic process like global warming. I show that when the time discount factor of agents in the model goes to one, the paths of Pareto optimal allocations and competitive equilibria converge. Furthermore, under certain conditions, when the time discount factor of agents goes to one, any gains by a unilateral deviation from the efficient path by an agent becomes arbitrarily small. Namely, a Pareto optimal allocation can be supported by an {dollar}epsilon{dollar}-Nash equilibrium, where {dollar}epsilon{dollar} goes to zero when the time discount factor of agents goes to one. I also discuss the policy implications of the above properties.; Chapter Three analyses the free-riding behavior in the international cooperation in dealing with global warming issues within the framework of a general equilibrium model of economic growth and global warming developed by W. D. Nordhaus (1992). I test the theoretic properties of cumulative public good proved in Chapter Two here. The testing results show that the severeness of free-riding behavior is decreasing when the time discount factor of the nations goes to one. Based on the above results, I suggest an incentive compatible policy package, with punitive taxation and environmental bonds as the components, supporting the international cooperation in controlling the emissions of global warming gases. |
