Why bills (don't) become law: The success and failure of government legislation in parliamentary democracie

Scholarship on executives' successes in enacting bills that they propose to their legislatures has emphasized the direct effects of institutional arrangements and the political effects of electoral and coalition-formation results. It has also largely focused on presidential democracies (to the exclusion of their parliamentary counterparts) and on aggregate-level rates of success (to the exclusion of individual bills). In addressing these shortcomings, I focus on executives as strategic actors who must and, even when faced with adverse conditions, are able to 1) ensure that their bills receive sufficient support, 2) receive formal expression of that support, and 3) desire enactment as an important goal. The latter two points have been largely ignored by work on legislative success, and I advance the theoretical understanding of the first by applying insights from Tsebelis' (2002) veto players theory. In a sample of 14 parliamentary democracies, I find that executives' rates of success are in fact not adversely affected by a number of factors that might seem to pose obstacles. In addition, I examine over 500 individual government bills introduced in the Canadian parliament, finding that, while initial lack of support reduces the likelihood of a bill's passage, it also makes the government more willing to accept amendments on bills. The acceptance of amendments, in turn, as well as efforts to expedite bills, increases the likelihood of enactment. I also find that the impact of government amendments is greater for bills that initially lack sufficient support than for bills that never lack sufficient support.